Messianic peacemakers: Intertextual relationships between Zechariah 9-14 and the Gospel of Matthew. This article deals with images of war, violence and peace and with the role of messianic leaders in Deutero-Zechariah and the way in which texts from Zechariah 9–14 have been interpreted in the Gospel of Matthew. The first section describes the lines of meaning in Zechariah 9–14 on the basis of word fields related to violence and universal peace. The second section discusses Deutero-Zechariah’s own position in the development (...) of messianic expectations in Old Testament texts. In the third section, the question is asked how the meaning of texts from Zechariah 9–14 about messianic leaders has been influenced by earlier prophetic texts, and how these texts in their turn have been transformed and updated in the Gospel of Matthew, which contains explicit quotations from Deutero-Zechariah in 21:5; 26:15; 26:31 and 27:9–10. The fourth section summarises some interesting semantic shifts appearing in Matthew’s gospel compared to Deutero-Zechariah. Moreover, some critical comments are presented against the idea defended in some recent studies that there is a sharp tension between Jesus’s role in Matthew as the bringer of a peaceful ethical message, and his violent and vindictive role at the final judgement. At the end of this article, the burning question is raised whether Zechariah’s and Matthew’s messages, both of which are characterised by a certain degree of exclusivity, can play a constructive role in modern multi-religious discussions about common roads leading to global peace. (shrink)

As an immediate reply, meanwhile, I should like to make a remark or two about what is perhaps the central issue raised in the foregoing Comment. This is whether Price's dispositional reduction, or anyone's dispositional reduction can adequately render the act of thinking. Alternatively, the question could, I think, be stated in more presently-favoured language. One could ask whether statements about universals, thoughts, concepts, or ideas can be logically deduced from dispositional statements not containing these "mentalistic" terms. If one is (...) inclined to prefer this more lengthy formulation one may then take this to be my meaning; whenever "dispositional solution" or "dispositional reduction" is mentioned one may translate it into this longer form. (shrink)

For any given society, its particular technology of communication has far-reaching consequences, not merely as regards social organization, but on the epistemic level as well. Plato's name-theory of meaning represents the transition from the age of primary orality to that of literacy; Wittgenstein's use-theory of meaning stands for the transition from the age of literacy to that of a second orality (audiovisual communication, electronic information processing). On the basis of a use-theory of meaning the problem of machine consciousness, to which (...) the later Wittgenstein again and again returned, is capable of a non-essentialist solution: appropriate changes in our form of life might well entail a radically different psychological language-game. (shrink)

Habermas's conception of deliberative democracy could be fruitfully supplemented with a discussion of the "institutional design" of civil society; for example the architecture of public spaces should be considered. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of architecture in his 'Aesthetics' can speak to this issue. For Hegel, architecture culminates in the gothic cathedral, because of how it fosters reflection on the part of the worshiper. This discussion suggests the possibility that architecture could foster a similar kind of intersubjective reflection. To (...) make his thoughts more pertinent for current debates, Hegel's views are adapted to fit three contemporary secular institutions. (shrink)

This article indicates some ways in which the fantasy of the brain in the vat has been used in thought experiments to discuss important philosophical problems. The first has to do with scepticism about the external world. The second has to do with Hilary Putnam’s arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and his rejection of metaphysical realism. The third issue to which the brain in the vat is relevant has to do with the difference between broad and narrow content of (...) beliefs and Putnam’s challenging assertion that reference is not ‘in the head’. Though there are brief suggestions for dealing with these problems and saving metaphysical realism, the main purpose is to indicate the relevance of the fantasy of the brain in the vat to discussion of these issues. (shrink)